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COLORADO ex rel. STATE BANKING BOARD v. FIRST
NATIONAL BANK AND INDEPENDENT BANKERS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. SMITH: IS A CUSTOMER-
BANK COMMUNICATION TERMINAL A BRANCH
BANK WITHIN THE McFADDEN ACT?
On May 28, 1975, the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado ruled that certain functions of a national bank's off-prem-
ises "customer-bank communication terminal" ("CBCT")1 fell within
the McFadden Act definition of branch bank2 while other functions of
the CBCT did not.3
On July 31, 1975, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that a national bank's off-premises CBCT was a
branch within the terms of the McFadden Act for all the functions
which it performed.4
In Colorado ex rel. State Banking Board v. First National Bank,5
the state sought a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction
1. The Comptroller of the Currency gave a basic definition of the customer-bank
communication terminal in an interpretive ruling:
In general, these terminals permit an existing bank customer to initiate trans-
actions resulting in a cash withdrawal from his account, a crediting of funds
to his account, a transfer between his checking and saving accounts, and pay-
ment transfers from his account into accounts maintained by other bank cus-
tomers.
Both manned and unmanned CBCTs are now in use. The CBCT typically
involves: (a) A card issued to and carried by the customer which is inserted
into the machine; and (b) a keyboard by which the customer or operator of
the CBCT can insert information as to the transaction the customer wished to
accomplish. The customer's card sometimes contains information as to what
transactions are authorized for that particular customer, and some CBCTs are
capable of updating that information at the completion of the transaction. The
CBCT may be self-contained, or it may be connected by wire (or line) to a
bank's central computer at a remote location.
39 Fed. Reg. 44416-17 (1974).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1970) provides:
(f) The term "branch" as used in this section shall be held to include
any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any
branch place of business located in any State or Territory of the United
States or in the District of Columbia at which deposits are received, or checks
paid, or money lent.
3. Colorado ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l. Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D.
Colo. 1975).
4. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, No. C.A. 75-0089 (D.D.C.
July 31, 1975).
5. 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975).
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against the allegedly illegal branch banking operations of the national
bank. The bank had established a CBCT 2.8 miles from the location of
the main bank building. The court had to decide if the CBCT constitut-
ed a branch bank under the McFadden Act. If the CBCT constituted
such a facility, the bank was in violation of Colorado laws dealing with
detached banking facilities. A violation of the Colorado laws concerning
branch banking would also be a violation of section 36(c) of title 12 of
the United States Code' which allows national banks to establish branch
banks only when they could be established under state law by state
banks.
The district court declared that to the extent the CBCT performed
the function of receiving deposits it constituted a branch bank,8 and
relied on previous case law' in deciding that this function of the CBCT
was within the definition of branch bank. The judge ruled there was no
functional difference between the making of a deposit in a CBCT and
the making of a deposit in a stationary receptacle. The United States
Supreme Court had previously decided that making deposits in stationary
receptacles constituted branch banking.10
Judge Matsch determined that the other functions of the CBCT did
not constitute branch banking. After defining the word check"1 the
judge noted that there was a difference between the presentation of a
check at a teller station and at a CBCT.
To instruct the bank by depressing keys on this Docutel ma-
chine is not the writing of an order for the bank to pay on
demand. It is comparable to the wire transfer of funds by com-
6. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-6-101(1) (1973).
7. 12 U.S.C. 3 6(c) (1970) provides in part:
(c) A national bank association may, with the approval of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the
limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by thelaw of the State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which
said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time
authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by lan-
guage specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by im-
plication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed
by the law of the State on State banks.
8. 394 F. Supp. at 984.
9. First Nat'l. Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
10. Id. at 137, 394 F. Supp. at 983-84.
11. The word "check" is defined in Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary, Unabridged, 1968, as "A written order directing a bank or banker to pay
money as therein stated .... ." The definition given to "check" in the Uni-
form Commercial Code is "... a draft drawn on a bank and payable on
demand."
394 F. Supp. at 984.
[Vol. 11: 85
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mercial customers and that is not considered to be the pay-
ment of a check. 12
Judge Matsch also concluded that the machine was not a place
where money was lent. He explained that the use of a card to receive
currency was not essentially different from using such a card to obtain
cash, services or products from a retailer,13 and continued, "[tio con-
clude that this function of the machine is branch banking would there-
fore require conclusion that any such use of bank credit cards is also
branch banking."'14
In Independent Bankers Association of America v. Smith,' 5 plain-
tiffs sought judicial review of an interpretive ruling of the Comptroller
of the Currency.' The Comptroller decided the CBCT was not a branch
12. Id. at 985.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, No. C.A. 75-0089 (D.D.C.
July 31, 1975).
16. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975) provides:
(a) A national bank may make available for use by its customers one or
more electronic devices or machines through which the customer may communi-
cate to the bank a request to withdraw money either from his account or from
a previously authorized line of credit, or an instruction to receive or transfer
funds for the customer's benefit. The device may receive or dispense cash in
accordance with such a request or instruction, subject to verification by the
bank. Such devices may be unmanned or manned by a bona fide third party
under contract to the bank. The bank for a reasonable period of time may
provide one of its employees to instruct and assist customers in the operation
of the device. Any transactions initiated by such a device shall be subject to
verification by the bank either by direct wire transmission or otherwise.(b) Use of such devices at locations other than the main office or a
branch office of the bank does not constitute branch banking. A bank may
provide insurance protection under its bonding program for transactions involv-
ing such devices.(c) The establishment and use of these devices is subject to the follow-
ing limitations:
(1) Written notice must be given to the Comptroller's Office and
to the office of the appropriate regional administrator 30 days before any
such device is put into operation. Such notice shall describe with regard
to the device or machine:
(i) The location;
(ii) A general description of the area where located (e.g.,
shopping center, gasoline station, supermarket) and the manner of
installation (e.g., free standing, exterior wall, separate interior booth);(iii) The manner of operation, including whether the device is
on-line;
(iv) The kinds of transaction which will be performed;
(v) Whether the device will be manned, and, if so, by whose
employee;
(vi) Whether the device will be shared, and, if so, under what
terms and with what other institutions and their location;
(vii) The manufacturer and, if owned, the purchase price or,
if leased, the lease payments and the name of the lessor;
(viii) The distance from the nearest banking office and from
the nearest similar device of the reporting bank; and
3
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within the meaning of the McFadden Act. The court examined the
legislative history of the Act and pertinent case law and decided CBCTs
did fall within the definition of branch bank. Judge Robinson referred
to First National Bank v. Dickinson17 where the United States Supreme
Court said that "the term 'branch bank' at the very least includes any
place for receiving deposits or paying checks or lending money apart
from the chartered premises; it may include more."' In the Comptrol-
ler's opinion, a CBCT was not a branch bank, branch office, branch
agency, additional office or any branch place of business because it
lacked certain physical characteristics of such facilities. However, Judge
Robinson, relying on the Courfs language in Dickinson, found that the
Comptroller's contention lacked merit."9
The Comptroller's determination that a CBCT did not receive
deposits, cash checks, or make loans was also found to be without merit.
After taking notice of the transactions which the Comptroller had
stipulated the CBCTs were capable of completing,2 ° the court referred
to the definitional section of the Act, and the following comment by
Representative McFadden: "Any place outside of or away from the
main office where the bank carries on the business of receiving deposits,
paying checks, lending money or transacting any business carried on at
the main office, is a branch."'" Judge Robinson ruled that "[tlhe Court
is compelled to conclude that since a CBCT 'transacts business which is
carried on at the main office' it is a 'branch' under the McFadden
Act.,, 22
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MCFADDEN ACT
To fully understand the opposing viewpoints presented in the two
district court opinions it is necessary to understand the legislative history
(ix) The distance from the nearest banking office and nearest
similar device of another commercial bank, which will not share the
facility, and the name of such other bank or banks.
(2) National banks are urged prior to July 1, 1975, not to estab-
lish a CBCT in any state in which state law would prohibit a state char-
tered bank from establishing a similar facility.
(3) To the extent consistent with the antitrust laws, national banks
are permitted, but not required, to share such devices with one or more
other financial institutions.
17. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
18. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
19. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, No. C.A. 75-0089 (D.D.C.
July 31, 1975) at 5.
20. See definition note 1 supra.
21. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, No. C.A. 75-0089 (D.D.C.
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of section 36(c) and (f) of title 12 of the United States Code and the
courts' interpretation of those sections.
In 1923 there appeared to be a developing problem concerning
branch banking in the United States. Wherever state law permitted
branch banking the state banks were opening new branches. At the
same time, national banks were unable to open branches because, under
the existing banking law, there was no statutory authority for such
action. In his Annual Report for 1923,23 the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy warned of the problems likely to be encountered by unlimited branch
banking on the part of state banks. The Comptroller noted that if such
branching continued "it will mean the eventual destruction of the na-
tional banking system .... 124
Representative McFadden responded to the problem in 1924 by
introducing legislation to equalize the ability of both national and state
banks to develop branches.25 The McFadden Act, eventually adopted in
1927, provides:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new
branches: (1) within the limits of the city, town, or village
in which said association is situated if such establishment and
operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks
by the law of the State in question . *...26
Representative McFadden later described the bill by saying "[c]om-
petitive equality has been established among all member banks of the
Federal Reserve System."2
During the 1930's Congress again took an interest in the branch
banking issue. Senator Carter Glass proposed legislation to allow nation-
al banks to establish branches, regardless of state law, beyond the
municipality in which the main bank was located. 28 The senator's
proposal was strongly opposed in Congress, and he was forced to alter
his original bill in order to obtain the support necessary for its accept-
23. H.R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924) construed in First Nat'l Bank
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 257 (1966).
24. 385 U.S. at 257.
25. Representative McFadden's first bill H.R. 8887, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924),
did not pass. It was reintroduced as H.R. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925). See Comment,
Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of a
"Branch Bank", 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 362, 372 n.46 (1975).
26. 12U.S.C.36(c)(1) (1970).
27. 68 CONG. REc. 5815 (1927) construed in First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 258 (1966).
28. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank, 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966).
19751
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ance by Congress. His revised bill became the Banking Act of 1933,29
which provides the current regulations for branch banking contained in
section 36(c) of title 12 of the United States Code. The major change in
the McFadden Act allowed national banks to establish branches at any
point within the state if state law allowed state banks to establish such
branches. Senator Glass made it clear that the establishment of the
national bank branches was to "be under the regulations required by
State law of State banks." 30 Senator Lang in his description of the bill
said "[w]e have only undertaken to secure equal treatment for State
banks. 31
The legislative history of the McFadden Act and the Banking Act
of 1933 discloses that the attempt to establish competitive equality
among the two banking systems was the primary congressional motive.
The McFadden Act was a reaction to competitive advantages which
state banks had gained by 1923. It was intended to create competitive
equality between the banks so that both banking systems could continue.
The Banking Act of 1933 demonstrated congressional reinforcement of
the theory of competitive equality in branch banking legislation. In
addition, Senator Glass' proposal to eliminate any consideration of state
law faced imminent defeat until it was revised to contain language
assuring competitive equality. The entire legislative history points to
competitive equality as the cornerstone of section 36(c).
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MCFADDEN ACT
The courts have also interpreted the legislative history of section
36(c) as an attempt by Congress to establish competitive equality
between national and state banking systems. In First National Bank v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co.,32 Justice Clark said:
It appears clear . . . that Congress intended to place
national and state banks on a basis of "competitive equality"
insofar as branch banking was concerned. . . . To us it
appears beyond question that the Congress was continuing its
policy of equalization first adopted in the National Banking
Act of 1864.2
29. 12U.S.C. 36(c)(2) (1970).
30. 77 CONG. Rac. 3726 (1933) construed in First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966).
31. 77 CONG. REc. 5862 (1933) construed in First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 260 (1966).
32. 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
33. Id. at 261.
[Vol. 11: 85
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In Dickinson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its interpretation of con-
gressional intent by concluding that "[tihe policy of competitive equali-
ty is therefore firmly embedded in the statutes governing the national
banking system. '34 The Court's interpretation of the McFadden Act has
at all times appeared to stress the fact that the congressional intent was
the creation of competitive equality.
Section 36(f) of title 12 of the United States Code is the definition-
al section of the McFadden Act, and there is little legislative history for
this section as compared to the congressional statements concerning
section 36(c). The most important interpretation of this section is
found in the Dickinson decision where the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the definition of branch in section 36(f) by concluding that
more must be taken into consideration in the definition of branch banks
than merely the words and the phrases making up the language of the
section. The concept that the McFadden Act was created to insure
competitive equality became a focal point in the Court's definition of
branch bank. In recognition of this concept, Chief Justice Burger said:
"In short, the definition of 'branch' in § 36(f) must not be given a
restrictive meaning which would frustrate the congressional intent this
Court found to be plain in Walker Bank. . . .-3 The Court also noted
the description Representative McFadden gave the statute: "Any place
outside of or away from the main office where the bank carries on its
business of receiving deposits, paying checks, lending money, or trans-
acting any business carried on at the main office, is a branch."3 6 It is
clear that the Court intended to develop a broad definition of what
would qualify as a branch bank under the Act.
In relation to what exact activities an establishment would have to
be engaged in to fall within the definition of branch bank, Chief Justice
Burger found that "the term 'branch bank' at the very least includes any
place for receiving deposits or paying checks or lending money apart
from the chartered premises; it may include more.13 7 That statement
could have far-reaching effects and discloses a belief by the Court that
the offering of any one of the three services mentioned would qualify an
establishment as a branch. However, the concluding phrase "it may
include more" goes much further. The statement is so open-ended that it
34. 396 U.S. at 133.
35. Id. at 134. The court in Walker Bank had found that the congressional intent
was clearly to establish competitive equality. First Natl Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966).
36. 396 U.S. at 134 n.8.
37. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original). See note 18 supra.
1975]
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may be used by many courts in the future to classify a whole number of
other services as branch banking. It is evident that the Court has gone
far in making sure that there will be no restriction of the definition of
branch bank.
In addition, the Court attempted to clarify whether the term branch
bank should be interpreted in accordance with applicable state law. It
held that state law could control the operation of branch banks but not
the definition of branch bank. The Chief Justice reasoned that "to allow
states to define the content of the term 'branch' would make them the
sole judges of their own powers.138
APPLICATION OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PRIOR CASE LAW
Three major rules concerning the branch banking law emerge from
a review of the legislative history and case law concerning section 36(c)
and (f): (1) competitive equality is to be of primary importance in
deciding whether an establishment constitutes a branch bank; (2) the
definition of branch bank must be broad and unrestricted so that the
factor of competitive equality may be freely taken into consideration;
and (3) the state law definitions of branch banking are not to have any
effect in deciding what constitutes branch banking under the federal
definition.
Independent Bankers adheres to the essence of these rules and is
consistent with the past history and interpretation of the McFadden
Act.39 The Independent Bankers court applied a broad definition of
branch bank, branch office, or additional office and did not restrict its
interpretation by considering only physical characteristics, as did the
Comptroller, but looked instead to the legislative history and case law.
The Comptroller asserted that the CBCT was not a branch because it
lacked the physical characteristics of a bank. However, Judge Robinson
relying on Dickinson specifically rejected this argument. The court was
not persuaded that the mere appearance of something could displace the
fact that the machinery functioned as a branch bank, and emphasized
function rather than allowing form to control. Referring to Representa-
tive McFadden's description of section 36(0 the justice said: "[S]ince a
CBCT 'transacts business which is carried on at the main office' it is a
38. Id. at 133.
39. In Independent Bankers the question of whether the state law definition of
branch bank would be the definition used in the federal law was never at issue.
Therefore, it is impossible to determine how the court would have ruled in that matter.
[Vol. 11: 85
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'branch' under the McFadden Act. 40
While the theory of competitive equality was never mentioned in
Independent Bankers it may be assumed that it was taken into consider-
ation. The court noted that it was basing its decision upon Dickinson
and Walker Bank. In both cases, the Supreme Court relied heavily on
the theory of competitive equality. 41
Although Independent Bankers never runs counter to the rules
which seem to be established by the past history of section 36, Judge
Robinson found it unnecessary in much of his opinion to use those
guidelines. It appears that Judge Robinson was able to find that the
CBCT was a branch bank by adhering to a literal interpretation of
sections 36(c) and (f).
Unlike Independent Bankers, Colorado ex rel. State Banking
Board v. First National Bank does not come within the framework of
the rules which the legislative history and the case law of section 36(c)
and (f) appear to mandate. The court in State Banking Board applied
a very restrictive test in deciding whether a CBCT is a place where
checks are paid. Judge Matsch admitted that the depressing of keys
to obtain cash and the presentation of a check for payment at a teller
station are quite similar.42 However, he overlooked the similarity in
result and based his decision on technical form. The judge used the
definition of check 3 to find that "the depressing of keys . . . is not
the writing of an order to pay on demand.14 4 In short, the form of the
transaction overcame the obvious similarity of the results.
While the distinction drawn in State Banking Board may be valid
in terms of the entire history surrounding section 36(f), it appears to be
too insignificant to be made the controlling factor in the decision. It is
obvious, that the drafters used the word check in 1927 because they did
not foresee the technological advances which were to occur forty years
later. It is unlikely that the legislators who were instrumental in the
passage of the McFadden Act would have been as interested as the court
in the difference between the writing of a check and the depressing of
keys on a machine. What would have interested them, as the legislative
history indicates, is the result. The United States Supreme Court has also
40. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, No. C.A. 75-0089 (D.D.C.
July 31, 1975) at 6.
41. Id. at 4.
42. 394 F. Supp. at 985.
43. Id. at 984. Judge Matsch's definition is reprinted in note 11 supra.
44. Id. at 985.
1975]
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shown more interest in the result than in the form of the transaction. 41
The result of the transaction is the same whether the check is presented
at a teller window or whether the keys of a machine are depressed at a
CBCT. In either case, an individual is able to receive money at a bank-
owned installation away from the bank's main office. Another result of
such a transaction at a national bank is to create a competitive advantage
in favor of the national bank if state banks are not permitted this func-
tion by state law. Therefore, if a CBCT is found not to constitute a
branch bank the result is the very opposite of what the legislators
intended. The court's opinion in State Banking Board lacks the use
of a broad definition as well as an analysis of the competitive
effect both of which are considerations imposed by the legislative history
and pertinent case law. Judge Matsch decided that the CBCT was not a
branch bank by comparing it to bank credit cards which operate with a
prearranged line of credit as the CBCT does. 46 He found no functional
difference between obtaining money from a CBCT and obtaining mon-
ey, services, or goods from a retailer by the use of a bank credit card;
and thus to maintain that a CBCT is the equivalent of a branch would
necessitate a finding that all such uses of bank credit cards constitute
branch banking.47 This interpretation involves too superficial a look at
the two services.
While the ability to obtain money from a CBCT is similar to
obtaining cash, services, and goods from a retailer, the services are by no
means equivalent. The act of receiving goods, services, or cash from a
retailer is not enough to make the use of a credit card branch banking.
That action only satisfies one part of the definition of branch banking.
A retailer's store would also have to be considered a branch office or
45. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969). The court ruled in
Dickinson that an armored car would fall within the definition of branch bank. The bank
had argued that it entered into contractual agreements with its customers which provided
that there would be no deposit until the money collected by the armored car was
delivered to the bank teller. The court found that such private contracts would not be the
controlling factor in deciding whether the armored car would be considered a branch
bank under section 36. Justice Burger said:
Because the purpose of the statute is to maintain competitive equality, it
is relevant in construing "branch" to consider, not merely the contractual rights
and liabilities created by the transaction, but all those aspects of the transac-
tion that might give the bank an advantage in its competition for customers.
Unquestionably, a competitive advantage accrues to a bank that provides the
service of receiving money for deposit at a place away from its main office:
the convenience to the customer is unrelated to whether the relationship of
debtor and creditor is established at the moment of receipt or somewhat later.
Id. at 136-37.
46. 394 F. Supp. at 985.
47. Id.
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additional office before the use of a bank credit card could constitute
branch banking. However, a retailer's store, garage, or office does not fit
the definition of a branch office or additional office. Obviously, addi-
tional offices or branch offices are either owned or rented by the main
bank. Since a retailer's establishment is owned by the retailer and not
by the bank, it does not constitute a branch office and the use of such
cards cannot be considered branch banking.
The CBCT provides cash as does a bank credit card. It also is a
branch office or additional office because it is owned or rented by the
bank. It fits both parts of the definition of a branch bank and constitutes
a place where branch banking is carried on. Thus, the use of the CBCT
qualifies as branch banking but the use of a credit card does not.
It is not known if Judge Matsch used a broad definition of branch
bank or if he took competitive equality into consideration in deciding
that the CBCT was a branch bank when its function included receiving
deposits. However, based upon Judge Matsch's previous interpretations
concerning the CBCT, it may be assumed that his decision was based
more on a reluctance to go against firmly established precedent in the
Dickinson case than on his acceptance of the competitive equality theory
or the idea that branch bank should be given an unrestricted definition.
The legislative history and decisions dealing with section 36(c)
and (f) appear to clearly suggest that a CBCT is a branch bank within
that statute. It could be assumed that by finding the CBCT to be a
branch bank the competitive equality intended by Congress would be
preserved. However, competitive equality is undermined by the fact that
a certain number of states have laws which disallow branch banking.
Those states define the CBCT as something other than a branch bank or
specifically exempt it from the branch banking statutes.4s If a national
48. A number of states have laws which allow CBCT systems while at the same time
disallowing branch banks or more severely restricting them. North Dakota allows the
establishment of paying stations which have area restrictions and are not allowed in
cities and towns where there are already banking establishments in existence. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 6-03-14 (1975). At the same time North Dakota has allowed the Bank of
North Dakota to establish electronic funds transfer systems that would provide the
transfer service to its customers and customers of other state and federally chartered
banks. The Act does not specifically limit the area in which the Bank of North Dakota
may establish these systems. N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-09-34 (1975). Washington allows
branch banks, outside the county in which the main bank is located, only if the main
bank has a paid-in surplus of a certain amount. Also, branches are allowed only in cities
and towns which do not already have a banking office. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
30.40.020 (Supp. 1974). Washington allows unmanned "satellite" facilities to be estab-
lished anywhere in the state. The "satellite" facilities are specifically defined as not being
branches. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.43.010, 30.43.020 (Supp. 1974). Minnesota
statutes specifically prohibit branch banks. MINN. STAT. ANN. 48.34 (1970). However,
1975]
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bank uses a CBCT it may be found to be a branch bank under the
federal definition in section 36(f), and if the state law forbids branch
banking the national bank would be forced to discontinue its use of the
CBCT. Yet, state law may define the CBCT as something other than a
branch bank and by doing so permits the state banks to use the device.
This creates a definite competitive advantage in favor of the state banks.
Courts dealing with the branch banking issue in the future will be
faced with a definite dilemma. If they rule that the CBCT is not a
branch then a competitive advantage will be given to the national bank-
ing system in states where branch banking is disallowed and the states
find that a CBCT is a branch bank. If the courts find that a CBCT is a
branch bank within section 36(f) then a competitive edge will be given
to the state banking system where state law disallows branch banking
but defines the CBCT as something other than a branch bank.
There is a solution to the courts' dilemma which would assure the
competitive equality Congress intended. The Supreme Court ruled in
Dickinson that the state law definitions of what constitutes branch
banking would not control the federal definition of branch banking.40 If
the Supreme Court had decided instead to uphold the Fifth Circuit's
determination that state law defintions could control,50 competitive
equality would continue to exist between the two banking systems. By
allowing state law definitions to control neither the state banking system
would be able to gain an unfair advantage. In support of the view that
state law should be controlling, the Fifth Circuit stated in Dickinson v.
First National Bank: "To be sure, national banks may well fear the au-
thority of the state comptrollers to make extreme use of this defining
process, but their recourse must be to Congress which legislated 'com-
petitive equality,' not to the courts who must follow it." 1 Chief Justice
Burger was correct in finding that there are problems in allowing state
Minnesota does allow one remote controlled mechanical device, called a detached
facility, within 3,000 feet of the main bank building. MrqN. STAT. ANN. § 47.52 (Supp.
1975). Nebraska also prohibits branch banking. NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-157 (1974). At the
same time, Nebraska has passed statutes which allow CBCT systems to be used by state
banks but provide specifically that the systems are not to be considered branch banks. 40
Fed. Reg. 21701 (1975). The Attorneys General of a number of states have also become
involved in the determination of whether CBCTs are branches within the law of their
state. The Attorneys General of Texas, Kansas, and Florida have authorized certain
CBCT systems to be established in those states even though state law prohibits branch
banking. 39 Fed. Red. 44419 (1974).
49. 396 U.S. at 133-34. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
50. Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 400 F.2d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 1968), a! 'd on other
grounds, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
51. Id. at 557.
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law definitions of branch bank to control the federal law definition.
However, there are even greater problems in attempting to have compe-
titive equality without the use of the state law definitions. With the in-
creased use of computer terminals and other nontraditional methods of
banking, the courts will be forced to recognize that state definitions of
branch banking must be applied in order to achieve competitive equality
between federal and state banks.
Douglas B. Chomeau
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